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CONG RESSIONA L R EC O RD
SENATE P R OCEE DIN GS
Septembe r 4, 1963
15462

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Presid ent, for
several weeks, the Senate has had the
proposed treaty on nuclear testing.
The question has been examined intensively not only by the Committee on
Foreign Relations but also by members
of the Aimed Services Committee and
the Sena te members of the Committee
on Atomic Energy, all of whom were invited to participate in the hearings, and
all of whom collectively comprise more
than one-third of the membership of
the Senate.
•
There has been in process, in short. a
very thorough Senate consideration of
the proposed treaty. The specific questions have already been asked and
answered, as far as it has been possible
to answer them. The specific doubts
have been raised , and, as far as possible,
laid to rest.
We are now approaching a point at
which we must put the penultimate
question in solitary conscience. It is
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this decision which will produce the
final vote by which the Senate will
either give or withhold consent to ratification of the proposed treaty.
The issue now is not whether Germany mistrusts the treaty or France
mistrusts it more or Communist China
most of all.
The issue, now, is not solely the meaning of the treaty for health and human
genetics, or for military strategy or for
the technology and costs of scientific
arms competition.
All these issues and others have been
considered in the painstaking interrogation of the past few weeks. Each has
its own unique significance. But each is
a fragment of the penultimate question
and must be so regarded if we are to
reach sound decision.
For the question which now confronts
us is the one question which is the sum
of the many questions. And a rational
response to it can only be the sum of the
many responses, weighed in the scale of
such wisdom and judgment as each of us
may possess. The attitude of no single
expert or group of experts in or out of
Government, no single official or group
of officials of this Government, no single
scientist or group of scientists can be
controlling on this question. The question is for us alone to decide. It is not
for any scientist, military leader, cabinet
secretary or whatever to decide for us.
It remains now for elected Senators to
decide for themselves, to confirm or refuse to confirm the judgment of an
elected President.
This penultimate question which confronts us is simply stated: Does the proposed treaty serve, on balance, the
interests of the people of the United
States, when those interests are considered in their totality? Or to put it negatively: Is the proposed treaty, on
balance, inimical to the interests of the
people of the United States?
If it is inimical, obviously, the President should not have had the treaty
signed in the first place and, certainly,
the Senate should not now consent to its
ratification. But if the treaty passes
even a minimal test, if reason tells us
that, on balance, the treaty is not inimical to this Nation, then that alone
would seem to be su.fflclent grounds for
approving it. For if we mean what we
say when we speak of supporting the
leadership of the President, irrespective
of party, in his great national responsibil!ties in foreign relations, we must
mean, at least, that in matters of this
kind, we are inclined to give him the
benefit of those vague and residual
hesitancies by which each of us ih his
own way may be possessed.
And may I add, Mr. President. that I
do not see how any Senator can vote
either for or against this treaty with a
sense of absolute assurance. In any major essay in foreign relations there are
bound to be-and there should be-hesitancies. They would be there if we debated the proposed treaty or any major
issue, a month, a year or a decade.
There were doubts and hesitancies
when a Republican Congress voted a
Marshall plan under a Democratic President. There were doubts and hesitan-
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cies when a Democratic Congress voted Harriman, on July 25, 1963. That agreea Middle East resolution under a Republi- ment, I would note in order to emphasize
can President. The doubts are there year its nonpartisan nature, is more closely in
in and year out when Congress considers accord with the concept of a nuclear test
the foreign aid program. For the simple ban as it is contained in the Republican
truth is that there are no certainties, no Party's presidential platform in 1960
absolutes in significant matters of for- than it is with the similar plank in the
Democratic Party's platform.
eign relations.
Indeed, were there no doubts on this
It is conceivable that one President of
question of a nuclear test ban that in the United States may have misjudt::cd
itself would be cause for the deepest con- the American interest in this highly sigcern. For the absence of any doubt nificant matter, although I do not for a
would suggest either a dangerous delu- moment suggest that such was the case
sion or an insipid insignificance in the with President Eisenhow~. But I find
treaty.
it most difficult to believe that two PresiThe truth is that there are risks in dents in succession would be guilty of
this as in any venture in foreign rela- negligence or poor judgment on precisely
tions. But I remind the Senate that the same question of national interest.
there are also risks in failing to venture, No, Mr. President, there is a strong prein standing still in a world which does sumption that a test ban treaty is not
not stand still for this or any other na- only not inimical to the interests of the
tion. And at this moment in the world's people of the Nation but also is to their
time, the risks of a paralyzed uncertain- positive advantage,
ty may be far greater than those which
Further, Mr. President, when members
might stem from the pursuit of this ven- of the Committee on Foreign Relations
ture.
and the Committee on Armed Services
Indeed, there is a strong presumption and the Senate members of the Joint
that such must be the case. I say that, Committee on Atomic Energy probe
Mr. President, because this proposed every word, comma, and period of the
treaty is no instant fancy, no sudden text of the treaty; when they examine
concoction. We have not arrived in haste every conceivable implication of the
at this point of decision. The active treaty for days on end; when they hear
pursuit of a treaty to ban nuclear tests countless relevant witnesses of the execbegan many years ago under the ad- utive branch, including the Secretary of
ministration of President Eisenhower. State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
The previous administration was not pas- Chiefs, the Chairman of the Atomic
sive and negative in its approach. It Energy Commission, and the Director of
sought a treaty in a most active and the CIA give sober but unmistakable suppositive fashion. Indeed, the former port for this treaty; when the commitVice President, Mr. Nixon, journeyed to tees summon for testimony not only the
Moscow in 1959 in an effort to further advocates of this treaty but also its most
this objective, among others, of U.S. for- articulate and competent opponents-in
eign policy. And in a letter dated April short, when the treaty is subjected to the
13, 1959, President Eisenhower wrote Mr. most stringent Senate committee scrutiny
and the great preponderance of Informed
Khrushchev that:
The United States strongly seeks a lasting testimony is favorable-there is a strong
agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear presumption that the treaty is in the posweapons tests.
itive interests of the United States.
I should like to read an extract from
Note, Mr. President, the phrase
the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of
"strongly seeks."
In short, Mr. President, the search for Staff before the combined committees In
a nuclear test ban treaty was clearly a executive session. This testimony I uncardinal element in the foreign policy of derstand, after checking, has now been
the Nation during the second Eisenhower cleared. I refer to this extract because
administration. When Mr. Kennedy as- of the particular importance which is
sumed office, he did hot have to continue attached to the defense aspects of the
that search. He could have abandoned treaty.
Senator MANSFIELI>-it. He could have ignored the efforts of
the previous administration. He could
Asking a question of General LeMayhave turned his back on the affirmations General, did I understand you correctlyin favor of a nuclear test ban treaty, as you do favor the ratification o! this treaty?
they were contained in the platforms of
General LEMAY. Providing the safeguards
both parties during the 1960 presidential are forthcoming.
campaign and upon which Mr. Kennedy
Senator MANSFIELD. General Wheelerand Mr. Nixon stood for office. That is
Who, of course, is the Chief of Staff
a prerogative of the Presidency, and Mr.
Kennedy could have exercised it had he of the Armyjudged, after a full examination of all Did I understand you In the same sense?
General WHEELER. Yes, sir.
relevant information, that the policy was
Senator MANSFIELD. Admiral McDonald?
detrimental to the interests of the
Nation.
Who, of course, is the Chief of Naval
But Mr. Kennedy did not so find. On Operationsthe contrary, he pursued the matter even
Admiral McDoNALD. Yes, slr.
as Mr. Eisenhower had done before him.
Senator MANSFIELD. General Shoup?
And he continued to pursue it in spite of
Who, of course, Is Commandant of the
repeated setbacks and frustrations not
unlike those undergone by his predeces- Marine CorpsGeneral SHOUP. Definitely.
sor, until an agreement was, at last iniSenator MANSFIELD. That Is all, Mr. Chairtialed by his distinguished agent, the
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Averell man.
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And yet, Mr. President, a strong
presumption is not enough in a matter
of this kind . Each Senator has an individual responsibility to examine this
treaty for himself In the light of his
own conscience and his own concept of
the interests of his State and the Nation.
The Senator from Montana has done
so, and he has just returned from reporting to the people whom he represents on
his position on this treaty, which will
be before the Senate very shortly. And
having done so, he is persuaded that the
proposed treaty does no violence to but,
on the contrary, serves the interes ts of
the people of his State and the Nation.
It serves those interests, Immediately
and tangibly, in matters of public health
as they may involve a resident or a child
yet to be born in Montana or in any one
of the 50 States. I refer, Mr. President,
to the question of radiation which, as an
uninvited but ever-present spectator, has
haunted these hearings of the past few
weekB. To be sure, there may be a lack
of certainty among scientists and doctors
on the precise effects of manmade radiation on health and the human species.
But let there be no mistake about it.
There is a minimal concept of the dangers of radiation from which reputable
scientific and medical opinion does not
depart. I.t is expressed very clearly in
the unanimnus report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Facts
of Atomic Radiation, 17th Session of the
General Assembly, 1962. In this report,
scientists from 15 nations, including
France, the United States, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Canada recorded their unanimous
agreement that-The exposure o! mankind to radiation !rom
Increasing numbers o! artificial sources lncludlng the worldwide contamination o! the
environment with short- and long-Uved
radlonucl1des from weapons tests calls !or
the closest attention particularly because the
el'!ects o! any Increase In radiation exposure
may not be tully manl!ested !or several decades In the case o! somatic disease and !or
many generations In the case or genetic damage. There should be no misunderstanding
about the reality o! genetic damage !rom
radiation. The Committee therefore emphasizes the need that all forms o! u n necessary radiation exposure should be minimized
or avoided entirely, particularly when the
exposure ot large popula tlons Is en tailed.

Mr. President, so far as I am aware,
that statement has not been challenged
from a reputable medical or scientific
source anywhere in the world. It is a
most conservative statement and one
must question the sobriety of anyone
who would pass off the factor of radiation damage as irrelevant or propagandistic In the consideration of the proposed treaty. It Is of central importance.
For what the statement says, In effect, Is
that we do not know precisely how harmful manmade radioactivity Is but we are
certain that tt is not good for human
health or for the genetics of the human
race. It is not good, in short, !or men,
women and children-and particularly
children-in Montana, Arizona, Ohio,
Washington, Nevada, Mississippi, Utah,
or Missouri any more than In London,
Paris, Moscow, Pelplng or Tokyo. What
the statement says, in effect, Is that
radiological techniciall8 in hospitals do

not wear heavy protective clothing and
dentists do not shelter themselves for
the fun of it when they take X-rays.
They do so because the stuff of X-rays,
as of nuclear bomb tests, Is lnsiduously
dangerous. What the statement says, in
effect, is that it is highly inadvisable to
put even minute quantities of strontium
90 or 89 into milk or to add other radioact ive isotopes such as iodine 131 or
cesium 137 to bread, as though they
were vitamin A, B, C, or D. They are
quite the reverse in their effect on human h ealth and on the human species.
The statement says, in short: handle
manmade radioactivity with extreme
care or, preferably, do not handle it at
aU.
Yet we have been compelling our own
people to handle it, as well as the Russian people and others, and the Russians have been compelling their people
as well as ours and others to handle it.
That has been the consequence of bomb
tests because, beyond the radiation rele ased in proximity to a tes t site, the
phenomenon of fallout results in a wide
distribution throughout the world from
each detonation, wherever it may occur.
And radioactivity is both ideologically
neutral and wholly indifferent to national boundaries. When carried in the
air currents and clouds of the atmosphere It places free peoples, Communist
peoples or whatever, all on this planet,
in the same radioactive boat.
We w!ll find some scientific voices saying that it is not too bad and very temporary, this thing which has already
been done by nuclear bomb tests to the
planetary setting In which all human
life is lived. we will find some scientific
opinion which takes the opposite view,
that the genetic damage already done
has been very substantial. And we will
find many scientists who say so far it is
not too bad, but we had better avoid
much more. That there are these differences Is a reflection not so much of a
disagreement on the !acts but of a
paucity of facts and of differing values
which are put on the integrity of the individual human life. Some are more
prepared than others, apparently, to
sacrifice this Integrity on the altar of
science !or what is regarded as a valid
scientific or defense purpose.
In terms of statistics, our own Federal
Radiation Council has made some estimates of the human costs of the radioactive byproducts of nuclear bomb tests-.
The figures which It supplies are axelusive of tbe effects of the last Russian
test series of superbombs in 1962. The
Council Indicates that all tests in the
United States and throughout the world
through 1961 cnuld produce In this Nation In this and future generations anywhere up to 15,000 cases of gross physIcal and mental birth defects and,
pt>ssibly, up to a maximum of 2,000
leukemia cases and up to a maXimum of
700 cases of bone cancer within the next
70 years. Other adverse health etrects
of these tests, as, for example, those of
radioactive Iodine 131 to ch11dren's
thyroids in the vicinity of tests sites in
the Mountan States of the West, are
strongly suspect. The same is true of
ce5ium 137 which has been del!vered In
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heavy quantities to Eskimos in Alaska as
a result of Soviet tests in the Arctic.
Still other ill effects cannot even be
guessed at, as, for example, those of
carbon 14, which has a radioactive life
of several thousand years and may be
said, therefore, to have already altered
the human environment permanently.
Because of the difficulty in understanding some of these terms, I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my
remarks definitions of some of the items
which I referred to, as well as others not
mentioned, be incorporated in the REcORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
WALTERS in the chair). Is there objection?
There being no objection, the definitions were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
DEFINITIONS

Radlonucllde Is an isotope of an element
wi th radioactive characteristics.
I sotope Is an unstable variation or an
element.
Strontium 90 is a long-llvcd radlonucllde
(halt-life 28 years) with chemical properties
similar to calcium. (Strontium ltselt Is an
alka l!ne earth-metal element at No. 38.)
Strontium 90 tends to deposit In bones, entering the body In the total diet but especia lly through milk, wheat products, and
vegetables.
Str ontium 89 Is a radlonucllde, similar to
strontium 90 but has a halt-ll!e o! only 50
days. It, too, deposits preferentially In
bones. Milk Is the significant dietary contributor of strontium 89 but It also attaches
to the surface ot other foods.
Cesium 137 Is a long-lived radlonucllde
(halt-lite 30 years). (Cesium ltselt Is a soft
metallic element at No. 55.) Cesium 137 distributes throughout the soft-tissues of the
body, with milk, meat and vegetables the
main sources. AI; In the case ot strontium
90, dietary measurements o! cesium 137
fluctuate In consonance with the fallout rate.
Iodlne 131 Is a short-lived radlonucllde
(halt-lite 8 days). (Iodine ltselt Is a nonmetallic crystalline element at No. 53.) Deposited In the body, Iodine 131 concentrates
In the thyroid gland. Residence time, as
well as half-lite, Is short. The moet significant dietary contributor Is milk.
Carbon 14 Is a very long-lived radlonucllde
(halt-lite 5,760 years). It Is similar to nonradioactive carbon and Is produced both -n aturally by cosmic radiation and artificially
by bomb tests. The level ot carbon 14 In the
environment tends to decrease only as It enteres carbonates o! the deep ocean waters
and sediments. All Items o! diet contribute
to• the amount of carbon 14 In the body In
proportion to their carbon content.
Tritium Is the radioactive Isotope of hydrogen (halt-ll!e 12.4 years) which Is produced both naturally and by fallout. It
combines with oxygen to produce radioactive
water 'fhlch goes everywhere ordinary water
goes. On July 22, 1963 the Department of
Interior announced that tritium had reached
the highest concentration In ralnwate'r ever
measured by the Geological Survey.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, It
ls all very well to note that the statistical projections suggest only a very small
number of Amerlcall8 as adversely affected by all tests throughout the world
through 1961. But it would not be very
well to tell that to the specific Amerlcall8
who w1ll suffer the coll8equences. Furthermore, It is clear that the RUSsian
test series of 1962 wlll add to the specl.ftc
totals of health damage already projected in the United States. It is clear,
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too, that any additional tests in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union, the
United States, or any other country will
do the same and, in the absence of a
treaty, the addition to the totals can be
large or small, depending upon the whim
and the capacity not only of ourselves
but of the Soviet Union or any other
nation.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to
yield.
Mr. GORE. I have listened with great
Interest to the able address of the distinguished majority leader. Like me,
he does not claim the capacity to reach
scientific judgment in this complicated
and technical field.
As the Senator knows, it has been my
privilege to serve on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and I have listened to many scientists discourse upon
this subject. One thing I have never
heard any scientist say Is that any additional radioactivity would be beneficial
to the human race. They may disagree
as to the level of radiation that would
be tolerable-the tolerance point, so to
speak-they may disagree as to the
averaging and as to the probabilities of
IndividualS being severely damaged as a
result of accidental dosage of more than
the median amount of radiation; but I
have never heard any scientist say that
any additional radiation would be helpful to the human race.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I deeply appreciate the remarks of the Senator from
Tennessee. This is not the first time he
has made comments of that nature; and,
in all honesty, I must admit that one of
the reasons I am making this speech today is because of the comments he has
made on this particular subject over the
years. So I am deeply appreciative of
the comments he has just made.
Mr. President, it is clear, in short, that
however small the effects appear to be
in the statistical computation, nuclear
bomb testing has already caused a damage to human health and, potentially,
its continuance is a great danger to human health. It is so clear that it can
be said In this Senate that we will not
find one reputable scientific voice which
will advocate the continuance of bomb
tests on the grounds that they are a kind
of fillip for human health or a genetic
stimulant for the improvement of the
human species.
Therefore, the fundamental, If unspoken, assumption of the treaty must
be that neither this Nation nor the Soviet Union seeks the dubious distinction
of being the foremost contaminator of
the earth's physical environment with
radioactive substances. It is the assumption that the Russians are at least
rational enough and human enough to
be concerned with this menace to the
health of their children and their grandchildren as we are with respect to ours.
Those may be erroneous assumptions.
It may be, I suppose, that the Russians
are so obsessed with being first that it
Is all the same to them whether the race
has to do with the Olympic games, the
moon, economic growth, the ballet, or

radioactive contamination. It may be
that this obsession Is so strong that they
are prepared to sacrifice even their
progeny to it.
Even if it were so, even it the Russians
were Indifferent to the pollution of their
own place, along with every other nation's place, in the earth's environment,
then all it would signify is that this
treaty has little meaning. It would
signify that the treaty will not do much
good. But, then, with the safeguards
which are provided and assured, neither
will it do much harm.
For what would happen, Mr. President,
it we ventured on the assumption that
the Russians did not wish to menace the
health of their own people any more
than we and events proved us wrong?
At some point in the future, then, the
Russians would resume atmospheric and
marine testing. But would they not be
able to do that In any event In the ab.sence of a treaty? What is to stop them?
And if they resume this dubious process
of denaturizing the physical environment of mankind what is to stop us from
joining in this macabre competition once
again? Not this treaty, Mr. President.
There is nothing in this treaty which
would stop us in those circumstances.
And it has been made very clear In the
hearings that we intend to rejoin this
competition on very short notice If it Is
forced upon us.
No, Mr. President, if there is any safe
assumption in this treaty, it Is that there
is an absolute mutual interest-that of
the preservation of human healthwhich applies to every nation on this
globe. This common interest will either
be pursued in good faith by all nations-especially by the United States and the
Soviet Union-or all will suffer the consequences of the failure to do so. There
is no escape. There Is no way, neither
sneak nor open, to gain an advantage In
this matter of health-not for us, not for
the Soviet Union, not for any nation.
For the simple fact Is that if there are
no atmospheric tests, the ~elger counters
will taper their rhythms everywhere. If
there are tests, the counters will click
their warning to human health in every
part of the world.
To be sure, Mr. President, there are
other nations-France and China in particular-which, health factors notwithstanding, have already announced that
they will not adhere to this treaty. Such
states will remain legally free to test nuclear weapons in any other environment.
But without this treaty such would still
6e the case. Even at worst, these countries cannot conceivably pose, for many
years, anything remotely resembling the
kind' of threat to human health which is
implicit in a resumption of unrestricted
nuclear testing by the United States and
the Soviet Union. With the treaty effectively maintained between the United
States, the Soviet Union and the United
Kingdom, we will have at least a period
of respite which, in itself, will be of some
worldwide health benefit. And with the
adherence of the great bulk of the civilized nations of the world-<>ver 80 nations have already signed the agreement-there will be an opportunity for a
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vigorous and concerted search !or additional ways to make the treaty universal in its application.
Mr. President, let me emphasize that
there are no grounds for sanguine expectations that this treaty, even if It is ratified by this Nation will bring an end to
the more dangerous types of nuclear
testing. It Is a tangible hope; that Is
all. But against that tangible hope there
Is certain dlspalr. In the absence of this
treaty, the process of radioactive contamination of the environment by bomb
tests will continue and in all probability
Intensify. Past experience Indicates that
deploring these tests in speeches and
party platforms will not end them. Introducing Senate resolutions against
them wm not prevent them. Passing
resolutions In the U.N. General Assembly
will not inhibit them. Voluntary moratoriums will not stop them. All these
experiences, short of a treaty, have been
tried and they have not succeeded. The
inescapable fact remains that a total
anarchy in this critical matter still exists
In the world. The inescapable !act is
that not only this Nation by every nation
is still completely free at this moment to
wreak damage not only on Its own heritage of the earth's environment but on
that of every other people. And the Inescapable fact is that the fear of losing
a technological military advantage or the
hope of gaining one-this terri!ying fear
and this elusive hope-which in the past,
have impelled the Russians no less than
ourselves to overlook the hazards to
human health In these tests will almost
certainly compel us to do the same in
the future. We shall be so impelled, and
they shall be so impelled, unless this
treaty enters into force and is scrupulously maintained on both sides. The
likelihood-! venture to say, the certainty-is that without this trooty, the
danger to the health of all Americans, of
all human beings, from bomb-made
radioactivity, w111 multiply. Neither an
embarrassed silence nor a soft-pedaled
evasion of experience and fact changes
the reality one Iota.
Even if the treaty comes into force, It
is obvious that this treaty, in itself, will
fiot halt the continuing and intense
scientific and technological competition
to gain a military advantage or to avoid
losing one. That w111 go on for the present on both sides, as is very apparent
from the Senate hearings and from
statements emanating from Moscow.
But what the treaty does do is to put
a muzzle on one aspect of that competition. What the treaty does do is to force
the competition, Insofar as It is now dependent on nuclear testing on both sides,
out of the atmosphere and from the seas
and onto the design boards and Into the
factories and beneath the ground.
The treaty may not work, Mr. President. It may be cheated or frightened
or suspicioned or reserved or exceptioned
into discard, quickly or In time. It may
be, in the end, no more effective than the
voluntary moratoriums and the resolutions or whatever of the past. And the
world w111 go on deploring these tests
even as they multiply,
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I hope no Senator wlll vote for ratification of this treaty on the mistaken belief that It Is a guarantee that bomb
tests wm now cease for all times. The
truth is that in voting for ratification
of this treaty, as I have already stated,
we will be voting for a hope. But let me
stress Mr. President, that it Is a significant, a tangible hope.
And so long as that hope, that tangible
hope is present, the Senator from Montana Is not going to tell the people of h is
State, that he voted to dash it, to kill
it. He Is not going to tell the people
whom he represents that President
Kennedy brought this hope, first raised
under President Eisenhower, to binding
treaty form-this hope that there will
no longer be avoidable increases in the
incidence of leukemia, bone cancer,
thyroid cancer, birth malformations, and
other radiologically Induced deficiencies
among Montanans and Americans and
all human beings-but, for a variety of
reasons, he could not support the President. The Senator from Montana is not
going to say that he could not support
the President because the French Government or the Chinese Communist government did not like the treaty. Nor will
he say It because a prominent scientist
out of a large number of prominent scientists registered the very unscientific
fiat of his own opinion that the treaty
was a dreadful tragic mistake. Nor will
he say It because he is convinced that in
a wasteful spending competition on armaments, our taxpayers can outspend
the Russians, spend them into bankruptcy without going bankrupt ourselves.
Nor will he say it because the statistical evidence showed only a few Americans would die before their time or only
a few American children would be born
malformed because of tests already conducted. Nor will he say it because the
treaty might also be signed by East Germany and he would much rather that
the East Germans begin testing nuclear
bombs than that even the remotest suggestion be given that the United States
had, by getting Into the same treaty,
somehow recognized the existence of this
East German regime.
Nor w11! he say it because he believes
that Russians, who most certainly cannot
be trusted In many things, cannot be
trusted even to cease denaturlzing their
own environment along with ours and
everyone else's on earth.
No, Mr. President, the Senator from
Montana Is not going to tell Montanans
that he opposed this treaty on any of
these grounds. Yet all have been advanced at one time or another in the past
weeks as grounds for rejecting this treaty
There is one ground--<me ground
alone-on which the Senator !rom Montana would be prepared to go home and
tell the people who sent him to WashIngton that these tests In the atmosphere
and In the seas must go on despite the
great potential threat of their continuance to their health and to their children's health.
He would not make light of these
health risks or pass over them but he
would ask his constituents to accept
them In all their grim portent because he
was persuaded that this treaty would ex-

pose the Nation, to a greater extent than
we now are, to a military attack which
would destroy both the meaning and
much of the substance of the life which
we have built.
He would not ask them to accept the
health risks of Indiscriminate and uncontrolled nuclear testing If all he had
was a personal surmise that the risks of
military attack would Increase, if all he
had were vague personal doubts and hesitancies in the face of a new course. To
ask them to accept the health risks, he
would have to find m the total record
specifics for concludin g that the nsks of
military attack would be significantly increased by our adherence to this treaty.
He would have to find , in specifics, affirmative answers to these questions :
First. Is there some nation, other t han
the Soviet Union-Communist China,
for example-which, by not adhering to
this treaty, Is likely to develop a nuclear
technology which will approximate ours
In the next decade, another nation which
could close the nuclear gap solely because it tested and we did not? The
answer is " No."
Second. If the Soviet Union, then, is
the one nation which poses a nuclear
threat to the United States in the next
decade or more, has that nation already
achieved a substantial advantage, on
balance, over the United States in the
military technology derived !rom nuclear physics-the kind of advantage
which we might neutralize by a continuance of aboveground tests on our side
even though they also continued to improve their techniques through such
testing on their side? The answer, Insofar as It is possible to answer the question, on the basis of fact, knowledge and
the overwhelming judgment of the most
highly skilled and qualified witnesses ln
the Nation is "No."
Third. Is there any reason to assume
that our adavnces in nuclear science and
its application to military technology
w!ll be hampered to a greater degree
than that of the Soviet Union, In the
complete absence of atmospheric and
marine tests on both sides? The answer
Is "No."
Fourth. By the terms of this treaty,
wlll the Soviet Union be legally authorized to do anything which we are not also
authorized to do? The answer is "No."
Fifth. By the terms of this treaty aFe
we legally forbidden to do anything
which the Soviet Union is not legally forbidden to do? The answer Is "No."
Sixth. Is there any other than the
most remote possibility that the Soviet
Union could engage in prohibited but
significant tests without detection? The
answer Is "No."
Seventh. If the Soviet Union were
to engage In a clandestine test and 11 it
were identified or if we had very valid
reason to believe that such a test had
occurred even if not identtfted, would
we ourselves still be bound to forego a
resumption in testing above ground?
The answer Is "No."
Eighth. Is there a significant possibility that a single Soviet test suddenly
sprung upon us could so alter the balance of military forces between the two
nations as to increase the risk of mill-
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tary attack upon us. The answer 1s
''No."
In short, the answer to every spectftc
doubt which Involves the possibility of
the Soviet Union or any nation gaining
some unique or significant military advantage as against ourselves in this
treaty is not "Yes" but "No." And because It Is no, I cannot in good conscience ask any citizen of Montana to
accept the heightened risks to the health
of their families which will be inevitable
in the absence of the ratification of this
treaty by the United States.
If there are not specific grounds of
unique disadvantage to the military defense of the Nation for rejecting this
treaty, what other grounds can there
be? One detects in the few articulate
opponents of this treaty a consistent
theme which suggests a basis for the remaining doubts and hesitancies. It is,
apparently, the belief that our scientificmilitary complex Is so superior to all
others that if not subjected to any limitation as to nuclear testing, it will produce an amazing advance in militarynuclear technology. The complex, It Is
suggested, will achieve some incredible
breakthrough so as to widen, once and
for all, the gap as between ourselves and
the Soviet Union. That the Soviet
Union, of course, in the absence of a
testing limitation, will also be free to
seek a similar breakthrough is either
overlooked or regarded of little consequence. That there are dangers to
health in the continuing process of uncontrolled testing by both sides, of
course, is either overlooked or regarded
as of little consequence.
Mr. President, I have the highest respect for our nuclear physics. our industrial technology, our military leadership,
and our capacity to merge them into a
powerful complex for the purpose of the
Nation's defense. This complex is second
to none In the world. But admiration
and respect for these capacities do not
and must never compel the elected omCials of this Nation to accept the dictum
of this complex as to what is best for the
people of the United States.
The fact is that this treaty will Introduce no curbs upon the creativity and
dynamism of the complex which are not
also placed equally upon such complexes
in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the
world. That men of scientific genius or
highly developed technological specialization may find such curbs irksome or
burdensome is understandable. But
there Is too much at stake here, for the
Nation and tor the world, for the Senate
to be persuaded by individual considerations of that kind.
Indeed, reason and experience must
lead us to question most seriously the
course of policy which fiows from such
considerations. It is the course which
assumes that If we will only continue to
debar any restraints on testing, It we will
only continue to throw considerations of
public health to the winds, our scientists
and our technicians will create that decisive nuclear gap, that ultimate military
gap, which will insure the Nation's security.
Have we not in reality followed precisely such a course since the first atomic
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bombs in the New Mexico Flats and over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What restraints, indeed, what reins have been
placed on the full exploration of this
immense power of nuclear destruction in
all these years? Not those of money, to
be sure. Not those of a ban on testing,
to be sure. Through all these years since
World War II there has been no treaty to
bar nuclear tests of any kind. We have
tested again and again. The Russians
have done the same.
What has happened, Mr. President?
We began in 1945 with the atomic bomb,
with what we believed was the decisive
gap, the ultimate gap. By 1949, 4 years
later, the Russians began to close that
gap with their first atomic test. In 1952,
we opened what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the
first explosion of the immensely more
powerful hydrogen bomb. And by 1953,
9 months later, that gap too began to
close in a Soviet test of a similar type of
weapon.
So we must ask ourselves, Mr. President: What has happened in all these
years of unrestricted testing? Has the
gap widened with the free rein which has
been allowed to the scientific-industrialmilitary complex? Have we· gained the
absolute advantage, the ultimate advantage which will guarantee the Nation's
security? The truth is that the gap has
not widened. On the contrary, it has
narrowed almost to the vanishing point.
It has narrowed both in terms of the
basic knowledge of the sciences involved
and in terms of the application of that
knowledge in military technology.
Once no nation, except ourselves,
could have inflicted on any other, tens
ot millions of nuclear deaths in a matter
of hours. Now, we ourselves, no less
than others, are subject to a catastrophe
of this magnitude.
In short, the Nation has not been made
more secure in any real sense by this
indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit of
security by nuclear development through
almost two decades, for the simple reason that others were also engaged in the
same indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit. This Jurious and frantic race for
superiority in the capacity to inflict nuclear devastation in mass or in caliperic
refinement in the interests of national
security in the end has provided security
to no nation. It has provided only the
assurance that the prospect of immediate and massive destruction to others
will be at least as great as that prospect
is to ourselves. That is vitally important
Insurance in the kind of world in which
we llve, but let us not delude ourselves
as to the nature of the coverage. We
have provided, not security for the Nation, but only insurance that if our civilization is put to the nuclear torch by any
hand, others will be consumed in the
same stupendous blaze.
To cling to the belief that the continuance of indiscriminate testing is the
margin which provides for the security
at this Nation is to fly in the face of the
reallty of experience. It is not a scientific view. It is not even an understandable pride and faith in our own great
scientlftc, technological, and mllitary
No. l38--6

capacities. It is a mystic and egocentric
be!Jef which borders-and I choose the
words carefully-on a most dangerous
and tragic obsession.
Mr. President, this treaty, in itself, is
no answer to that obsession. This treaty
is but a slender strand of hope drawn
painfully from the web of conflicting
interests, hideous fears and fatuous and
immature arrogances 'Out of which are
spun the relations of nations in our
times. It is an evidence, slight and uncertain, but an evidence, that there exists that capacity of courage and that
will to life which may yet bring to bear
on this stiftling entanglement the quiet
and simple power of human reason.
Do not, Mr. President, look for miracles from this treaty. There are none.
This Nation, the Soviet Union, and the
world are destined to live for a long time
with feet dangling over the grave that
beckons to the human civilization which
is our common heritage. Against that
immense void of darkness, this treaty is
a feeble candle. It is a flicker of light
where there has been no light.
The Senator from Montana will vote
for this light, and he will hope for its
strengthening by subsequent acts of reason on all sides. He will vote for approval of this treaty because it is, on
clear balance, in the Interests of the
people of his State and the United States.
He will vote for it because it is a testament to the universal vitality of reason.
He will vote for it because it is an affirmation of human life itself.
Mr. President, that the record may be
complete, I ask unanimous consent that
two previous statements which I have
made in connection with the treaty be
included at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the CONGRESSWNAL RECORD, July 29 ,
19631
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a.t the present time the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, a.nd
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a.re
meeting, In Informal session, to hear a. briefIng on the proposed pa.rtlal test ba.n treaty
by the Under Secretary of State, the Honorable Averell Harriman, who !s accompanied
by Mr. Wllllam Foster. At the meeting the
questions are both searching a.nd blunt,
judging from what I ca.n gather; a.nd I a.m
sure everyone would agree that the proposed
agreement was openly arrived at and could
be considered a.n open agreement.
In response to questions, the distinguished
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Harriman,
stated that there were no gimmicks or side
Issues attached to the proposal, which shortly
w!ll be before the Senate.
In connection w!th the proposed partial
nuclear-test-ban agreement, I e.sk unanimous consent that there be printed In the
RECORD a statement Issued by me over the
weekend, relative to this most Important
matter.
There being no objection, the statement
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, e.s
follows:
"STATEMENT BY SENATOR

MANSFIELD

"The proposed partial test ba.n a.greemen t
represents a. breakthrough In the cold wa.r
a.nd could, 1! properly observed by both
sides, be ihe first break In the clouds In
many years.

"It Is a. tribute to the pers is ten c e ,
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sanshlp and wisdom , first, of President Elsenhower In 1959 a nd, then, or President Kennedy a.nd or the many Members o r the
Senate and Congress as , for exn mplP, the
dlstlngulshcd Senator from Tenner;see l l\1r.
GOREI , the majority whip IMr. HuMPHREY I,
and the Senator !rom Connec ticut 1Mr. Dono]
whose reeolutio n in fnvor o f an ngrcezncnt
along the lines whi c h have been reac hed Is
cosponsored by 33 o t her Senators, memb ers
of both parties.
"These men recognized the need for an end
to above-gro und tests-on publlc health
grounds. If no other-nnd refused to be d is couraged In s pite of many setbacks and dlsappoin tmen ts. They thought In far-sigh ted
terms a.nd In huma n terms- or this generation and of chlldren yet to be bo rn- AmerIcan chlldrcn, Russia n chlldren, Indeed, nll
the wodd's chlldren.
"The agreement wo uld n o t mean a. cutback In defense appro priatio ns but a. stablllzatlon rather than an Increase or those
expend! tures.
"In a sense It Is a gamble, but In view of
the critical nature of the problem and the
fac t that we can continue underground tes tIng, It Is In my opinion worth the effort. The
escape clause protects us ln a.n honorable
manner a.nd safeguards rather than weakens
our defense. The !act that our chle! negotiator we.s Averell Harriman who has never
been taken In by the Soviet Union, ever since
he first served a.s Ambassador to the Soviet
Union two decades ago, Is an earnest that
our rights have been fully protected. The
agreement, In my opinion, serves the Interests
of our country. our people, and our securltv.
"If this agreement Is approved It does not
mean that there w!ll be total or unllateral
disarmament either soon or In the future .
What this new agreement wlll give us Is
more clean milk and water and food for our
chlldren, less strontium to pollute the alr,
a.nd some ba.sls !or hoping that future generations wlll grow up a.s normal, healthy
human beings.
"This agreement wlll, In my opinion, serve
the people's Interest, give us some time to
face up to other differences, and allow more
'breathing' space to the end that a better
kind of peace !or mankind can be achieved.
"It would be wrong to make too much of
this agreement. But, even more, It would
be wrong to make too llttle or lt. A step,
however small, In the direction or preservIng a. world fit !or human habitation Is an
immense stride In the history of human
clvll!zatlon."
[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 31 ,
196JI
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there have
been Inferences In the press to the effect
that polltlca.l partisanship ma.y be motivatIng the distinguished minority leader 1Mr.
DIRKSEN] and the chairman of the Republlca.n pollcy committee, the ranking minorIty member o! the Foreign Relations Committee a.nd the Joint Atomic Energy Committee (Mr. HrcJtENLOOPER] In their attitudes
toward the nuclear teEt treaty.
It Is most disturbing to me, Mr. President,
to witness this eH'ort to !an the tla.rnes of
partisanship on a. matter o! such urgent nnd
ovenldlng national Importance. I must reject any such Inference Insofar as It Involves
the minority leader [Mr. 'DrRKS!:N] or the
distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOoPER] or, !or that matter, any other
Senator-Republlcan or Democrat.
Both a.re men o! the highest patriotism,
a.nd have shown time a.nd again a mature
and unquallfied capacity to place the national Interest In foreign relations above
partisan consideration. They have consistently supported the main body or Amer!-
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can policy through several administrationsadministrations of both parties.
Their attitude Is entirely In order. It Is
their responsibility as Senators-I\Ot as Republicans-In positions of great responsibilIty to be most prudent and careful In the
consideration of this proposed treaty. And
may I say that the same applies to the
majority leader and the rest of the leadership on this side of the. aisle.
It would have been, Indeed, Inappropriate
at this time for the Senator from Illinois,
no less than the Senator from Montana, to
have gone to Moscow tor the ceremony of
signing the treaty.
There Is a great backlog of legislation In
process In the Senate at this time, highly
Important legislation to the Nation In many
fields; and both the minority leader and the
majority leader must continue to try, as we
have been trying, to bring this legislation
to the point of decision In the Senate.
As It Is, an exceptionally appropriate bipartisan group will go to Moscow from the
Senate-not necessarily to approve, but to
represent the Senate for the signing That Is
as It should be, for an occasion which Involves the constitutional responsibility o!
the Senate to advise and consent with respect to treaty ratification. The Senators
who are going- the distinguished chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr .
FuLBRIGHT]; the Senator f:om Minnesota
[Mr. HUMPHREY], the deputy majority leader,
whose name has long been associated with
this effort; the Senator from Rhode Island
[Mr. PASTORE]. who as chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy haa great
knowledge of the subject matter of the
treaty; the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the senior Republican In
this body, wise with a long experience In
the Senate and In foreign relations and
atomic energy; and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. SALTONSTALL] ranking Republican of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees--this group or Senators
who are going, Mr. President, Is admirably
equipped to represent the Senate with dignity and wisdom on this highly significant
occasion or worldwide significance.
This bipartisan group, Mr. President, of
which I personally am extremely proud, Is
In keeping with the spirit or bipartisanship
which has guided the policy of the United
States from the outset on the matter of nuclear testing. In a matter which Involves
the safety or the Nation and the health of
our people, and particularly our children,
there Is no room for partisanship. Certainly
a treaty which would seek to prevent precisely those nuclear explosions which are
most contaminative or our physical environment can be regarded as such a matter. Certainly, too, this proposed treaty has Implications !or the safety or the Nation.
I do n o t prejudge, Mr. President, the Senate's action with regard to the treaty. But
the records of the distinguished minority
le nder [Mr. DIRKSEN], and of the Senator
from Iowa (Mr. HICKENLOOPER] In matters Of
this kind , as I have noted, of'Cer great assurance that the question of the treaty will
be examined In terms of the highest national
Interest and free of partisanship.
Moreover, Mr. President, both parties In
the campaign of 1960 adopted positions
clearly In line with what has now been
achieved In the Initialed treaty to end nuclear
tes ting. I must sa y, in all honesty, that the
Republican p;atform is clearer on this point
th a n the Democratic platform. But I am
s ure that t his is primarily a matter of draftsm .lnship. and is not indicative In any way
or a lesser desire on the part of Democrats
to b ring £1bo ut an end to these dangerous
tes ts. Democrats as a Whole are just as concerned as Republicans when the safety and
health or the Nation are at stake. In any
eve n t. Mr. President, I read Into the RECORD
at th is point the reference to nuclear testing

In the Republican and Democratic platforms
of 196Q.
The Democratic platform, 1000, section II,
under the heading "Arma Control," states:
"A primary task Is to develop responsible
proposals that wiiJ help break the deadlock
on arms control.
"Such proposals should Include means !or
ending nuclear tests unc!er workable safeguards, cutting back nuc· "ar weapons, reducing conventional forces, preserving outer
space for peaceful purposes, preventing surprise attack and llml ting the risk of accidental war."
Thl! Republlcan platform, 1000, under the
heading "Foreign Polley," states
"We are slmllarly ready to negctiate and
to Institute reallstic methods and safeguards
for disarmament and !or the suspension of
nuclear tests. We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forego nuclear tests
In the atmosphere, and the suspension of
other tests as verification techniques permit. We support the President to any decision he may make to reevaluate the question of resumption or underground nuclear
explosions testing, if the Geneva Conference falls to produce a satisfactory agreement. We have deep concern about the
mounting nuclear arms race. This concern
leads us to seek disarmament and nuclear
agreements. And an equal concern to protect all people from nuclear danger leads us
to insist that such agreements have adequate safeguards."
Again I say that I am extremely proud of
the bipartisan group which has been selected
to represent this body and this country at
Moscow. I do not belleve that under any circumstances a more capable group, or men of
greater Integrity and patriotism, could have
been selected.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I appreciate
the generous statement by the distinguished
majority leader [Mr. MANSMELD]. I need no
defense for my conduct. I have always been
willing to assume full respooslbllity for what
I say and do. Under the Constitution the
Senate has the duty and responslblllty to
advise and consent to a treaty. That action
must constitute an Independent judgment,
and that judgment I will render under my
oath, according to my conscience, and withIn the limit or my perception as I can bring
It to bear.
I recall that once a President sought assistance in building up support for a League
of Nations. Members of my party followed
him throughout the country. He returned
from that tour a broken and dejected mao.
It always hurt me to think that happened
to a great scholar who was then the President or the United States-Woodrow Wllsoo.
For myself I try never to embarrass the
President of the United States. I shall always bend over backward to make certain
that he is not projected into any awkward
situation.
Ten days ago I went to the Press Gallery
of this body.
The question was asked
whether I had been invited to go to Moscow.
The answer was that I had not been invited,
directly or Indirectly, remotely or otherwise,
by anyone, anywhere, at any time.
Second, I stated that If I were Invited. I
would not go. I made that statement publlcly on a number of occasions. In so d oin«
I closed the door tor myself and for anyo;~
else who might undertake to iad te me. I
wlll never embarrass an;oue. I made that
abundantly clear. Not the least, of course .
Of the COnsideratiOnS that
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decision is the fact that V.P u rt t>r- .ct with
so much work. I did not f•·e l Llla t r_rru ld
take time off and go to Moscow for that purpose, since the occasion was a ceremony of
slgoioe;, and no negotiation was Involved .
I am deeply grateful to my distinguished
friend from Montana for the generous statement that he made on the fioor of the Senate. Beyond that, I know o! nothing I need
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say. I have neither encouraged nor d.lecouraged any Member of this body from t&klng that trip 1! he were Invited to go. Eveq.
Senator has equal prerogatives. I do not feel
that It Is either my responslblllty or my
prerogative to undertake to tell other Members of this distinguished body what they
should do under those circumstances. So I
leave the case there.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, last night the
President of the United States asked me to
go to Moscow as a representative or the
United States In the final ceremony preliminary to the signing of the test ban treaty.
Of the 100 Members of the Senate, I do not
belleve there Is anyone who dlsllkea the
thought of a foreign trip any more than I do.
But when the President of the United States
asked me to take the trip in the Interest of
the United States, I did not think I had any
right to fold my hands and tell him that I
did not want to go, and that I am not going.
Mr. President, when any program Is Initiated that looks toward the easing of tension
throughout the world, and has for Its purpose the averting of a war throughout the
world, even though such program offers only
a faint hope-and in my opinion that Is
what the proposed test ban treaty does-I do
not think I have any right to say that I am
not interested In any effort for peace In the
world regardless of whether It promises Immediate and early success or not.
Mr. President, as one Member of this body
who was aaked to go to Moscow I can say that
I have not· been asked to commit myself In
any way. I understand that no Member of
the Senate will be asked to sign the treaty.
I agree that Congress should examine every
line of the document when It Is submitted to
us for our approval or disapproval. It Is
proper that we should weigh the benet!ta of
approval against .any possible disadvantages
or risks which we may run. It 1s probable
that we may have to weigh our hopes against
our fears. I have heard It said that Congress
ought not to be represented at this meeting
because Congress did not participate In writIng the treaty. May I say that many Members o! the Congress were shown the treaty
10 days ago-a week ago last Monday. I
have examined It closely. I have read and
reread It from end to end and from the
middle toward both ends. I know that
probably hal! the Members of the Senate
have had the same opportunity that I have
had.
I do not believe It is a proper function of
the legislative br!lllch of Government to
wrl te treaties. It Is our function to approve
or to disapprove them after they have been
prepared by the executive branch of the
Government.
In this case I must say that the executive
branch of the Government did seek the approval of three committees of the Congress
before finally authorizing the Initialing ot
the treaty a week ago.
My position now Is that, unless I am shown
more evidence than has appeared to date
that the treaty will be disadvantageous to
the United States, I expect to support Its
approval when It comes before the Senate
for 11 vu te. I reserve the right to vote as I
bellc 1·c p roper when the time comes and after
full llcru·llie"S have J::>een hPlrl

